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While Europe has been working to institutionalize liberalized trade since the 1950s, the 
formation of the European Union in 1993 sparked a rapid economic progression through 
a political and economic union of its 27 member states.  The European Union has 
developed a single market through a standardized system of laws which apply in all 
member states, guaranteeing the freedom of movement of people, goods, services and 
capital (European Commission 2009). It maintains common trade, agricultural, and 
regional development policies.  Not only has the EU opened trade within Europe, but it 
has also helped open Europe to the rest of the global market.  The creation of a common 
market and promotion of free market policies with the rest of the world is just the 
beginning however.  The EU has consistently pursued neoliberalism on many fronts.   
 
The European Parliament has a wide range of powers that allow this institution to 
influence the economic direction of the European Union.  It has been shown that the 
European Union is pursuing neoliberal economic policies among its member states a 
well as with the rest of the global economy.  It also has a relatively high proportion f 
women as Members of Parliament.  By analyzing roll-call voting by gender from the
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 European Union, two questions can be answered.  First, have women as a group of 
legislators voted differently than their male counterparts on neoliberal policies in the EP?  
Second, if there is a difference, has it been significant enough to alter the economic 
direction of Europe?  Before analyzing neoliberalism in the context of the EU, itis 
crucial to understand neoliberalism and its various dimensions.  
 
WHAT IS NEOLIBERALISM? 
 
 
Neoliberalism is an ideological and theoretical framework that promotes capitalism 
mainly in the form of free market and unlimited capital mobility policies. It is often 
referred to as the “Washington Consensus,” a term coined by John Williamson to 
describe a set of ten economic policy prescriptions of a standard reform package for 
developing and crisis-wrecked countries.  While the United States itself does not directly 
push such policies on nations, it has incredible influence over the policy direction of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank which aid in the development of 
undeveloped nations.  This aid is often tied to the implementation of neoliberal economic 
policies.  The Washington Consensus is not merely a definition.  It stipulates the mann r 
and situation in which the neoliberal policies are implemented. This work will not 
analyze neoliberalism from this perspective, but it is necessary to make a distinction 
between the idea of the “Washington Consensus” and the economic policy aspects of 
neoliberalism.       
 
Debate continues regarding the definition of the Washington Consensus, and whether it 
even exists.  Many issues regarding neoliberal economic policies today, however, ar  still 
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best understood by using the term as a reference point. The ten policy prescriptions 
described by Williamson are a useful guide to defining neoliberalism in any context, 
including the European Union.  As such, the following bulletins will be used as a partial 
definition for neoliberalism: 
- Fiscal policy discipline. 
 
- Redirection of public spending from subsidies (especially indiscriminate 
subsidies) toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like 
primary education, primary health care, and infrastructure investment.  
 
- Tax reform in the form of broadening the tax base and adopting moderate 
marginal tax rates. 
 
- Interest rates that are market determined and positive, but moderate, in real terms. 
 
- Competitive exchange rates (a competitive rate is one that is not overvalued).  
Competitive exchange rates create growth because it will increase demand for 
exports and import substitutes and will therefore boost aggregate demand. 
 
- Trade liberalization: The liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on 
elimination of quantitative restrictions. Any trade protection is to be provided by 
law and relatively uniform tariffs.  
 
- Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment.  
 
- Privatization of state enterprises. 
 
- Deregulation. Abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict 
competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer 
protection grounds, and prudent oversight of financial institutions.  
 
- Legal security for property rights.  
 
(John Williamson 1990) 
 
In addition to these ten economic policy prescriptions, economist Dani Rodrik explains 
that in order to fully explain contemporary neoliberal issues, the list should also include 
the following: 
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- Corporate governance 
- Anti-corruption 
- Flexible labor markets 
- World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements 
- Financial codes and standards 
- “Prudent” capital-account opening 
- Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
- Independent central banks/inflation targeting 
- Social safety nets 
- Targeted poverty reduction 
(Rodrik 2001) 
These economic policies all operate in an attempt to achieve a market that is undisturbed 
by trade restrictions, tariffs, corporate abuse, volatile exchange rates, cpital and labor 
mobility restrictions, corruption, anti-trust issues, or state intervention.  Each of the 
mentioned economic policy prescriptions will be used as a definition for neoliberalism 
throughout the rest of this article.  
 
NEOLIBERALISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
Memories of the Great Depression, and the condition of post-war Europe left the free 
market and capital mobility agenda largely discredited.  The post-war reconstruction of 
Europe, led by the U.S. with the European Recovery Plan and the Marshal Plan, created 
an era of state coordinated development and welfare programs as opposed to market 
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coordinated development.  Keynesian economic theory prevailed as the theoretical 
foundation for macroeconomic coordination (Hermann 2005: 8).  In fact, it was not until 
the late 1950s that free trade become prominent in European economic policy discussion.  
The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 brought about the establishment of the 
European Economic Community (ECC).  Article 3 of the original treaty shows that 
member states were committed to the development of “a common market free of 
distortions to competition” (Cini and McGowan 1998: 17).  The term distortion was 
limited to tariffs and trade restrictions without addressing the main restrictions placed on 
capital and labor mobility.  The ECC merged with other European organizations to 
become the European Communities (EC) in 1965, but this organization achieved little in 
the furthering of neoliberal economic principals until the 1980s.  This was changed by the 
ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 which put the goal of a single 
market permanently on the European agenda.  The SEA established the idea of an 
international market discipline, and neoliberalism was then institutionalized in Europe 
(Hermann 2005: 8).  It also increased the responsibilities and powers of the European 
Parliament as an advocate for the single market agenda.  These responsibilities and 
powers will be further discussed in the next section.  The SEA paved the road for a 
European competition policy, structured by the foundations of neoliberalism, the 
formation of the European Monetary Union, and ultimately the official establishment of 
the European Union in 1993.  
 
Today, the European Union continues to pursue and preserve a single European market 
through the elimination of trade barriers, customs regulations, capital and labor mo ility 
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restrictions, as well as attempting to establish a union wide policy for agricultu e, energy, 
infrastructure, education and research, environmental issues, and competition.  The 
European competition policy seeks to ensure that the free market is permitted to operate 
undistorted by corruption, anti-trust issues, or state aid.  In addition to promoting 
neoliberal policies within Europe, the EU has worked to remove trade restrictions with 
the rest of the world.  Thus, it is the overall economic objective of the EU to promote a 
free market that is unimpeded by trade restrictions, capital or labor mobility restrictions, 
state intervention, including state-owned enterprises, along with eliminating exchange 
rate volatility through the use of a single currency.  It is clear that the European Union is 
operating within the ideological and theoretical framework of neoliberalism as defined by 
Williamson (1990) and Rodrik (2001).  
 
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
  
The European Parliament, based in both Strasbourg and Brussels, is the only directly 
elected legislative body of the European Union.  The European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union form the bicameral legislative body of the EU.  The two 
bodies practice what is known as co-decision; this means that each branch shares equ l 
power with regard to passing or amending legislation.  The European Parliament began 
1952 as the Common Assembly for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  
Nineteen seventy nine marked the first time that members of the European Parli ment 
were directly elected and also initialized its role in drafting proposals regarding the 
functioning of the EU.   
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Since the establishment of the European Union, the European Parliament has been 
granted greater power through various treaties.  It is important to note, however, that 
neither the Council of the European Union nor the European Parliament has the power of 
legislative initiative.  The European Parliament does not have the ability to draf or 
propose laws or legislation; this right is reserved for the European Commission.  The 
European Commission acts as an executive of the European Union. The body is 
responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the Union's 
treaties and the general day-to-day running of the EU.  The European Parliament’s 
powers lie in amending, passing, or rejecting legislation drafted by the European 
Commission.  Such legislation includes regulations, directives, and decisions that are 
directly applicable in their entirety to either the EU and all members or particular member 
states.  The Parliament is also responsible for approving all developmental gras,
including those overseas.  The legislative branch officially holds the Union's budgetary 
authority, powers gained through the Budgetary Treaties of the 1970s. The EU's budget is 
divided into compulsory and non-compulsory spending. Compulsory spending is that 
resulting from EU treaties and international agreements; the rest is non-compulsory.  The 
EP is even provided with a certain amount of control over the executive offices of the 
European Union.  Unlike most Parliaments within European Union member states, there 
is a system of checks and balances within the executive and legislative bodies, making 
the European Parliament resemble the United States Congress as opposed to the 
European parliamentary system.  While a president is nominated by the European 
Commission, it is the duty of the Parliament to approve the election of the President.  The 
Parliament also has the ability to censure the European Commission which obtains the 
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power of legislative initiative.  A two-thirds majority vote by the Parliament would force 
the resignation of the entire European Commission.  Supervisory powers are given to the 
EP as well; the EP has the ability to set up a Committee of Inquiry, Committee of 
Petitions, and place executives within institutions such as the European Central Ba k.  
While there are many other responsibilities dedicated to the EP, this brief explanation of 
their functions and powers outlines its extensive role in Europe.  The powers of the 
European Parliament are far reaching and of great importance to the functioning of the 
European Union as a whole.   
 
For a better understanding of the European Parliament’s legislative powers, it is 
necessary to explain the four types of parliamentary procedures that will beincluded in 
the analysis in order to fully understand the nature of each vote.  Each vote will coincde 
with one of the following procedures: 
 
Assent Procedure: Requires the European Council to obtain the European Parliament's 
assent before certain important decisions are taken.  The European Council is the highest 
political body of the European Union. It comprises the heads of state or government of 
the Union's member states along with the President of the European Commission.   
Parliament may accept or reject a proposal but cannot amend it. If Parliament does not 
give its assent, the act in question cannot be adopted.  Examples of assent procedures 
include specific tasks of the European Central Bank (ECB), amendments of statutes of 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) / European Central Bank, Structural 
Funds and Cohesion Funds, the uniform electoral procedure for the European Parliament, 
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certain international agreements, the accession of new member states, and approval of the 
President and the other members of the Commission. 
 
Codecision Procedure: Gives the European Parliament the power to adopt instruments 
jointly with the Council of the European Union. It has the effect of increasing contacts 
between the Parliament and the Council, the co-legislators, and with the European 
Commission. It has strengthened Parliament's legislative powers in the following fields: 
the free movement of workers, right of establishment1, free movement of services2, the 
internal market, education, health, consumer policy, trans-European networks, 
environment, culture, and research. 
 
Cooperation Procedure: Gives the European Parliament greater influence in the 
legislative process by allowing it two "readings".  The cooperation procedure appli s 
exclusively to the field of economic and monetary union.  The cooperation procedure is 
always initiated by a proposal from the Commission forwarded to the Council and the 
European Parliament. In the context of a first reading, Parliament issues an opinion on the 
Commission proposal. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, then draws up a 
common position, which is forwarded to Parliament together with all the necessary 
information and the reasons which led the Council to adopt this common position. 
                                                
1 Right of Establishment: Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities 
as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms. 
2 Free Movement of Services: The freedom prohibits restrictions on free circulation of services within 
Member States. Services are defined in the negative, “ h y are normally provided for remuneration, in so 
far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and 
persons.” (Art. 50 EC). 
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Consultation Procedure:  Enables the European Parliament to give its opinion on a 
proposal from the Commission. In the cases laid down by the Treaty, the Council must 
consult the European Parliament before voting on the Commission proposal and take its 
views into account. However, it is not bound by the Parliament's position but only by the 
obligation to consult it. Parliament must be consulted again if the Council deviates too far
from the initial proposal. The powers of Parliament are fairly limited under this 
procedure, in so far as it can only hope that the Commission takes its amendments into 
account in an amended proposal. 
 
WHY STUDY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT? 
 
With a basic understanding of the functioning of the European Parliament, one still may 
ask, why study the European Parliament in the context of women and neoliberalism?  
There are three main reasons for selecting the EP.  First, the powers listed above do not 
simply imply political power, but also power in determining the economic direction of 
the European Union.  While the Parliament does not propose legislation themselves, it 
has the ability to amend, approve, or deny any legislation dealing with economic issues
within the European Union and, in some cases, with international trade issues.  The EP’s 
power over developmental aid as well as the ability to select executives for economic 
institutions such as the European Central Bank give the Parliament a great deal of 
influence in European economic policy.  The second reason for studying the EP is the 
ability to distinguish the role of gender in institutional actions.  Unlike other economic 
institutions of the EU, the decision-making process in the Parliament can be track d for 
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each and every Member of European Parliament (MEPs).  This can be accomplished 
through roll-call voting records which provide information regarding the legislation being 
voted on, the date of the vote, and exactly how each MEP voted.    The third reason, for 
studying the EP is the fairly high percentage of female MEPs which will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next section.   These three points make the European Parliament a 
relevant institution by which to study women and neoliberalism.  
 
WOMEN AS MEPS 
 
The European Parliament has been directly elected since 1979, and the percentage of 
women represented has consistently increased through 2008.  Beginning with 19% of 
women in the Parliament in 1979, the European Parliament consists of 31% female 
membership of 785 MEPs as of 2008.  This is twice the percentage of women in the US 
Congress.  With regard to senior positions, the EP is structured as follows:  
• 6 women chair one of the 23 committees. 
• 13 of parliament's 37 delegations for relations with other countries have female 
chairs. 
• 5 of the 14 Parliament vice-presidents are women. 
• 2 of the 6 quaestors (who look after MEPs' interests) are women. 
• 2 of the 12 Presidents since direct elections in 1979 have been women - Simone 
Veil (1979-1982) and Nicole Fontaine (1999-2002). 
(Europarl 2008) 
There is a large range, however, from member state to member state with rgard to 
female representation.  Eight European Union members have greater than 30% female 
representation [(Sweden (47%), Finland (42%), the Netherlands (39%), Denmark, Spain, 
Belgium, Germany and Austria)].  There are also seven states with representation below 
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15% (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Ireland, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania and Malta) 
(Europarl 2008).   
Figure 1  
 
(EuroParl 2008) 
The European Parliament has also gone to great lengths to not only improve gender 
equality throughout the European Union, but also within the European Parliament as 
well.  The Parliament’s dedication to gender equality is shown by the development of the 
EP Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality.  The high percentage of 
women, along the dedication of gender equality by the EP, makes the Parliament a logical 
candidate for a study of gender and economics.   
 
With an understanding of the function and makeup of the European Parliament, it is now 
necessary to examine previous literature for the existence of a possible gender ap in how 
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men and women view neoliberal economic policies.  It is also necessary to examine the 
literature explaining how women function as legislators and the challenges they face.  








REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 




When examining possible sources for female distaste of neoliberalism one must mention 
the field of feminist economics.  Neo-classical economics are defined in masculine ways, 
i.e. the accumulation of wealth and the maximization of its value.  Even though wealth 
maximization is motivated by selfish interest, the interest of the individual usually 
translates into public interest.  Macroeconomic policy is based upon these assumptions, 
but these assumptions do not take into account the productivity of women that occurs 
outside of the typical work place.  Feminist economic theory focuses on the family and 
ranges from the “recognition that unpaid work is also valuable (even when there is no 
market for it)...to the problematic valuation of care-giving activities” (Dolfsma and 
Hoppe 2003: 124). Female productivity outside the typical workplace is not strongly 
valued and is not captured by usual economic measures such as GDP.  The economic 
policies of neoliberalism emphasize efficiency and growth while often ignoring women 
as a group as a productive member of the economy.
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The field of economics is also engendered by the way in which it is studied.  Quantitative 
research, such as econometrics, is considered hard, firm, definitive, and masculine while 
qualitative methods are often considered soft, weak, ambiguous, and feminine (Nelson 
1995: 139).  While each form of research has its positive characteristics, the latter dr ws 
a negative connotation more regularly.  This is crucial to understanding feminine 
opposition to neoliberal economic policy because the implementation and success of such 
policies are usually measured from the quantitative perspective.  Economic success is 
often based upon mathematical equations of state expenditures and GDP growth while 
ignoring social consequences that only qualitative research can capture.      
 
An examination of developmental psychology may help to shed light upon gendered 
economic perspectives.  Gilligan explains a divergence in male versus female values 
during the early stages of development (Gilligan 1982).  Females tend to experience a 
much closer bond with their mother, the primary caregiver, than males. This connecti 
seems to breed an ethic of care and an emphasis on relationships within women while 
men tend to develop a more distinct and definitive ethic of justice.  The female nature of 
compassion has implications that directly relate to neoliberal economic policy.  Women 
tend to be less competitive than men because of their relationship-based world view; they 
tend to be more concerned with the impact of their success on those around them.  
Competition is the heart of neoliberal economic policy as it opens the flood gates of 
global competition.  This undoubtedly means the failure of many domestic firms and 
possibly entire industries.  Following Gilligan’s logic, this would be more likely to deter 
women from aspects of neoliberalism than men.   
 16
 
Also, the ethics of care leave women more concerned with issues of welfare and public 
services than their male counterparts (Paggione 2004, Conover 1988, Dabelko and 
Hernson 1997).  Women tend to be more liberal, and traditional liberal values include 
welfare, social programs, union, affirmative action, and other things that make states less 
economically efficient.  This may again lead to female distaste for neoliberalism as 
government spending is cut and large-scale privatization occurs.  This usually means less 
money for welfare related programs and the control of some public services turned over 
to private hands.  The privatization of such services is cause for concern, especially to 
women, who tend to believe that the state rather than the market should be responsible for 
the care of individuals (Sen 1996: 827). This does not imply a rejection of markets as 
efficient methods of production and distribution, but it calls for the subordination of 
markets to democratic objectives.  Lourdes explains that “the goal is to place economic 
activity at the service of human or people-centered development and not the other way 
around” (Lourdes 2003: 77).  This means striving for economic development and 
productivity that is not achieved for its own sake but to increase the collective well-being.  
This skepticism of the market’s ability to act in the best interest of society indicates 
skepticism of neoliberal policy’s ability to act in the best interest of society.     
 
The economic transition of CEE states since 1989 has brought many aspects of gender 
discrimination into the light.  Pailhe explains that labor discrimination within CEE states 
has increased female skepticism of the rapid free-market policy implementation (Pailhe 
2000: 522).  The transition has left women as victims of discrimination in the workforce 
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without any preventative regulation.  A survey performed by Pailhe shows high levels of 
unabated statistical discrimination in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Pola.  
This discrimination is derived from a general mindset that women are not capable of 
matching the productivity of men in many employment settings.  Gender is listed second 
only to lack of productivity as a reason to not retrench an employee.  Neoliberal 
economics emphasize deregulated efficiency and growth which has often failed larg  
segments of the population, particularly women who have borne the negative impacts of 
neoliberal policies.  Onyejekwe explains that there is a need in this process to 
“institutionalize regulations and structures that will provide for women’s welfare and 
empowerment” (Onyejekwe 2004: 30).  Blatant gender discrimination in the workforce 
within CEE states has left women critical of the unregulated market transition and led to 
calls for intervention.         
 
WOMEN AS LEGISLATORS 
 
 
While previous literature implies that women may be less supportive of neoliberal 
economic policy than men, it does not necessarily mean that female Members of 
Parliament will be less supportive.  They must be representative of their constitue cy 
which consists of both men and women.  Their party affiliation may also inhibit their 
ability to vote in line with their ideals regarding neoliberalism.  Research is s own that 
women can have enough influence to affect policy outcomes.  Politics have generally 
been considered a “man’s game” and a male dominated culture has created obstacles to 
the success and effectiveness of women as legislators.  It is important to look at 
institutional and cultural factors within the European Parliament that may impact the way 
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in which women vote and their effectiveness as legislators.  While this study i  focused 
on the European Parliament, there is a great deal of literature regarding women as 
legislators in other legislative settings that is highly relevant.   
 
Among legislative candidates, women tend to be more sympathetic to liberal concerns 
than men, but it is still not clear if a higher percentage of female representation leads or 
can lead to an alteration in agenda setting.  When analyzing the British Parliament of 
1987, Norris and Luvenduski find that women are first and foremost confined by party 
politics, but they explain that there is still a shift in support for feminine concerns with 
greater representation (Norris and Luvenduski 1989: 114).  While finding strong evidence 
that women are substantively different to their male colleagues, Norris and Luvenduski 
do not find strong evidence that substantive differences directly result in public policy or 
agenda transformation.  In spite of party politics, women are able to influence parliament 
in more indirect manners than voting such as written and oral questions, private 
correspondence, or select committee and adjournment debates.  This has only limited 
success, however, as women are subjected to many institutional and non-institutio al 
barriers that will be discussed in sections to follow. Norris and Luvenduski, among 
others, hypothesize that a “critical mass” of women must be reached in legislative bodies 
to overcome such barriers in order for true policy and agenda transformation to occur.  
This hypothesis is strongly debated in the literature.  
 
Critical mass theory predicts that gender balance in legislative policy priorities and 
agenda will not be achieved in a male-dominated legislature, and that women are more 
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successful when the legislature is relatively balanced (Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 
1991).  Michelle Saint-Germain explains that gender differences and the promotion of 
women’s interests become amplified once the percentage of women reaches 15%.  
Thomas (1991) discovered through a survey of U.S. state legislatures that gender 
differences in legislation regarding women issues were minimal in states with a low 
percentage of women and more evident in states with a high percentage of women.  Grey 
(2002) also noticed that female legislators were more actively involved in debates of 
women’s issues when the legislative body has reached the critical mass number of 15%. 
Without this proportion of female representatives, legislative procedures are dominated 
by male issue priorities.  According to this logic, women become tokens and less 
effective as legislators due to the male culture.  These scholars are confident that an 
unbalanced legislature will greatly hinder the promotion of a more liberal feminine 
agenda until the magic 15% is reached.    
 
The critical mass theory is debated, however, by several scholars (Kanter 1977; Bratton 
2005).   Kanter (1977) argues that when women are an overwhelming minority in various 
settings, they embody a “token” status.  This token status can lead to two different 
responses by women.  The first is overachievement.  Women may have a greater 
motivation to promote their priorities as they feel challenged to work against the status 
quo.  This can actually lead to greater achievement on behalf of women as they are 
empowered as symbols for their category.  The second and more common response is an 
attempt to limit visibility.  Women may attempt to blend seamlessly into the mal  culture.  
Their gender already garners extra and unwanted attention and pressure, so a “far of 
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visibility” is developed.  So while women may still achieve a great deal, they do so 
quietly.  While Kanter’s 1977 work is not focused on legislative bodies, it has been tied 
to legislatures by several scholars.  Bratton (2005) studies the lower house of state 
legislatures in an attempt to discover the reach of Kanter’s theory.  Bratton finds that 
these skewed settings often provide more motivation to promote women’s issues, and 
women are not only more active, but they are just as successful as male representativ . 
She argues that a critical mass is not necessary for the individual female success as a 
legislator, but a more equitable setting does provide a better environment for female
policy outputs.  The results indicate that as the percentage of women increases in  
legislature, the chance for women’s policy issues to be implemented increases.  The 
individual success of women is not dependent upon a critical mass, but a critical mass has 
the ability to change institutional procedures themselves along with policy outputs.  
 
A well balanced legislature, however, is not sufficient for significant policy utputs with 
regard to women’s issues.  The social dynamics of a legislative body has profound 
impacts on the ability for women to influence the legislative agenda and policy 
implementation.  Lyn Kathlene attempts to tackle the assumption that increased 
representation of females and/or minorities legislatures will provide greater influence 
over their issue priorities (1994).  Through an analysis of Colorado state legislature  
Kathlene finds that even in well-balanced legislatures there tends to be an environment 
that limits the progress of women.  The author uses transcripts from twelve state 
legislative committee hearings to examine the social dynamics.  She analyzes 
interruptions, position, and committee assignment to explain interactions as they relat  to 
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gender.  The findings reported suggest that women legislators, despite their greate
legislative representation, “may be seriously disadvantaged in committee hearings and 
unable to participate equally in legislative committee hearings” (Kathlene 1994: 573).  It 
turns out the women are just as successful as men when it comes to getting bills passed,
but the process leading up to this is far from fair.  The article shows that bills sponsored 
by women were more likely to be assigned to more than one House committee, were 
subjected to longer discussions in first committee hearings, and received twic as much 
hostile witness testimony.  So while the number of women in state legislatures is 
increasing, they continue to face obstacles due to the social construction and male 
dominated culture.   
 
Literature specific to female Members of European Parliament is fairly limited, so it is 
difficult to predict if women of the EP are subjected to similar environments as described 
in the various other legislatures.  Jane Freedman sheds some light on this issue through a 
study using a questionnaire and survey answered by female MEPs (2002).  Keeping in 
mind that the European Parliament does have what could be called a “critical mass” with 
30% of MEPs being female, Freedman attempts to measure the attitudes and perceived 
effectiveness of female legislators.  Freedman finds that women MEPs tend to “have a 
strong identification with women’s issues and believe they can escape the structural 
constraints of their institution and make a difference to policy initiatives” (Freedman 
188).  The female legislators do point out, however, that the European Parliament is still 
not a perfect example of gender equality, and significant differences in member 
representation exist throughout the various member states.  The questionnaire also shows 
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that female MEPs are motivated to bring the percentage of female representation closer to 
50%.  While female MEPs are still constrained by institutional and cultural barriers in the 
European Parliament, they are confident in their ability to promote their own interests and 
initiatives.  
 
With 30% of the European Parliament membership is female, Freedman seeks to explain 
why women have an easier time being elected to the EP than their own national 
legislatures.  Though she does not provide concrete evidence, she hypothesizes that the 
higher representation of women could “merely be a symptom of their undervaluation by 
politicians and parties in the member states” (Freedman 2002: 179).  Parties are more 
willing to elect females to the European Parliament rather than their own natio al 
legislatures because the EP is perceived as less important and less powerful.  This logic 
appears to suggest that where there is power there are not women, and where there a 
women there is not power.  As seen previously, however, the European Parliament has 
continued to gain strength and influence in European politics and policies.  So while 
women may be continued to be undervalued, their greater representation in the EP may 
unintentionally provide an opportunity for female MEPs to have a significant role in 
determining European policy.   
 
While it appears that the European Parliament is more progressive than many natio al 
legislative bodies with regards to gender equality, scholars have found evidence that 
women may still encounter indirect discrimination in the EP.  Work by Shaun Bowler 
and David Farrell suggests that women of the European Parliament may experience the 
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previously described challenges to a similar degree as those in national legisl tures 
(1995).  Bowler and Farrell describe the organization and specialization of the European 
Parliament and include gender as a variable for predictors of committee and position 
assignments within the EP.  Gender is statistically significant as a predictor of committee 
assignments in economics, social affairs, and environmental issues.  The coefficients 
show that women are much less likely to be assigned to committees dealing with 
economic issues and much more likely to be assigned to committees dealing with social 
issues and environmental issues.  While this will surely impact the amount of influence 
women will have on economic policy, it is important to note that women can still have a 
great deal of impact on the neoliberal direction of the European Parliament from social 
and environmental committees.      
 
In spite of these challenges faced by female MEPs, the European Parliament h s shown a 
dedication to gender equality.  This is made clear by the formation of groups such as the 
Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality and the Europeans Women’s 
Lobby.  While the effectiveness and importance of such groups is debated, it is seen as a 
crucial step towards equality, especially by women who do not have any such committee 
in their own national legislative bodies.  At the very least it has served as an example of 
progress for EU member states.  The committee has a strong dedication to women’s 
rights within Europe as well as women and elections within the European Parliament nd 








Previous literature shows the potential for a gender gap in the way in which men and 
women perceive neoliberal economic policies.  The literature also shows that women 
have a significant role in the European Parliament despite potentially facing greater 
challenges than men in policy and agenda influence.  It is the objective of this study to 
discover if a potential gender gap in neoliberal economic issues translates into a ge der 
gap in legislative voting on these issues.  If there is a gender gap, it is important t  
discover whether or not the gap is significant enough to alter the direction of European 
economic policy.  It is possible that even in the face of a gender gap, limitations in the 
culture and institution of the European Parliament could limit the ability of female MEPs 
to transform policy outcomes.  The literature, however, leads to the hypothesis that 
women MEPs will vote differently than their male counterparts on issues relating to 
neoliberalism, and the difference will be significant enough to alter policy outputs, even 





• Female Members of Parliament are more likely to vote against neoliberal 
economic policy than their male counterparts.   
• The high representation of women in the European Parliament (31%) means that 









In order to determine whether or not women vote differently than their male counterparts 
in the European Parliament, this study will utilize roll call voting records.  This is the way 
in which individual votes are recorded in various legislatures around the world.  It is 
known as the record of yeas and nays as it only records whether a particular legislator 
voted for or against a bill.  It has been argued that roll-call votes do not provide a 
sufficient data base for determining a legislator’s degree of support for legislation 
because it requires the assumption that a legislator is indifferent between two pieces of 
legislation, and the implied legislative preferences from roll-call votes is not equivalent to 
a legislators’ stated preferences (Gross 1979).  Votes on the same bill arcomparable 
however.  The data is abundant and available, and there is a long history of utilizing ro l-
call data.  Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland have put together a data set that
combines the roll call voting records with specific information about the individual 
legislators and details regarding the subject of each vote (2006).  This study will utilize 
the data from these three scholars.   
 
Using the details provided for each vote it is possible to distinguish which votes deal with 
issues that will fall under the category of neoliberal policy.  The selected vots range
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 from 1999 to 2004.  These issues are not just limited to the economic arena as neoliberal 
policy incorporates government spending and free market imposition through social 
programs and environmental regulations.  The data provides an opportunity to examine 
which way men and women voted on neoliberal policies.  The definitions provided by 
John Williamson and Dan Rodrik will be used to determine if a vote deals with neoliberal 
policy.  The following is a review of the neoliberal framework listed in Chapter I.  
1) Williamson (1990) 
- Fiscal policy discipline. 
 
- Redirection of public spending from subsidies (especially indiscriminate 
subsidies) toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like 
primary education, primary health care, and infrastructure investment.  
 
- Tax reform in the form of broadening the tax base and adopting moderate 
marginal tax rates. 
 
- Interest rates that are market determined and positive, but moderate, in real terms. 
 
- Competitive exchange rates. 
 
- Trade liberalization: The liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on 
elimination of quantitative restrictions. Any trade protection is to be provided by 
law and relatively uniform tariffs.  
 
- Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment.  
 
- Privatization of state enterprises. 
 
- Deregulation. Abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict 
competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer 
protection grounds, and prudent oversight of financial institutions.  
 
- Legal security for property rights.  
 
2) Rodrick (2001) 
- Corporate governance 
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- Anti-corruption 
- Flexible labor markets 
- World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements 
- Financial codes and standards 
- “Prudent” capital-account opening 
- Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
- Independent central banks/inflation targeting 
- Social safety nets 
- Targeted poverty reduction 
A vote that falls into at least one of these neoliberal guidelines may be included in th  
statistical analysis.  
Two questions will be answered with the roll-call data pertaining to neoliberalism.  First, 
do women tend to vote for or against neoliberal economic policies?  Second, was the 
number of female voters significant enough to alter the outcome of the legislative vote?  
A couple of regression techniques will be used to determine if there is a significant 
difference in neoliberal voting as it pertains to gender.  First, probit regressions will be 
used for each of the twelve votes which will provide coefficients for the binary dependent 
variables for the neoliberal legislation.  Next, two scales will be created.  One will 
include the legislative votes that are considered to be pro-neoliberal economi policy, and 
the second will include the votes that are considered to be anti-neoliberal.  Two separate 
linear regressions will then be used with the pooled votes.  This is done due to the fact 
that multiple issues are at play in each of the selected pieces of legislation.  Neoliberal 
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economic policy is not the only aspect to each vote.  Pooling the votes together as pro or 
anti-neoliberal may help to better distinguish a pattern with regard to gender and 
neoliberalism.   
 
To answer the second question (was the number of female voters significant enough to 
alter the outcome of the legislative vote?), a summary will then be provided for 
legislation that was passed by a margin less than or equal to the number of female 
legislators.  If a bill passed or failed by a margin of equal or lesser value than the number 
of female representatives, it will be labeled as strongly influenced by women.  A 
percentage of neoliberal economic initiatives of this nature will be provided.  Prvious 
literature leads to the expectation that there will be a difference in men and women in 
terms of neoliberal voting habits, and this part of the analysis will determine if the 
difference is significant enough to influence policy outcomes.    
 
Four important controls will be included in the regression.  The first of these control 
variables will be the political party family which will be explained in greater detail in the 
“Regression Analysis” section.  Previous research has shown that political party is a 
strong indication of policy preference and issue salience, in the U.S. (Lawless 2004), as 
well as within the European Parliament (Hix 2001).  Research has also shown the 
existence of the same “left versus right” dimension that exists in domestic poli cs within 
the European Parliament (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006: 494).  It has also been seen in 
the literature that both male and female MEPs are tied to party politics which may 
influence voting patterns.  The second of these controls will measure age; different 
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generations had varying economic experiences.  Some legislators have been part of a free 
market economy for the duration of their lives, while other nations have experienced 
communism and an economic transition from a command economy to an open economy.  
Previous studies have shown age related patterns in political orientation including 
economics (Watts 1999 and Laz 1998).  The third control will be for nationality as 
economic characteristics can change radically from state to state.  Again, the different 
member states of the European Union have a wide background of neoliberal policy 
experience.  Economic culture is also a function of the state.  The fourth variable will 
control for European Parliament Group to which each MEP belongs.  European 
Parliament Groups are organized based on loose ideology within the European 
Parliament.  With these variables controlled, the regression should effectively isolate the 
impact of gender on neoliberal economic preference in legislative voting in the European 
Parliament.  
 
A brief description of the specific votes being used in the data analysis will now be given.  
The information regarding each legislative action has been obtained from the official
European Parliament website archives (www.europarl.europa.eu).  The votes have been 
coded as 1 for a pro-neoliberal vote and 0 for an anti-neoliberal vote so that each separate 
regression will measure gender’s impact in the same direction.  The votes have been 
coded by their chronological ID from the aforementioned database.   
 
Vote 1 (Resolution 3062):  Broad economic policy guidelines - The sharp and partially 
expected downturn in economic growth of the European Union that marked 2001 has 
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shown that the EU economy needs stronger co-ordination and an improved policy mix; 
the binding nature of the Stability and Growth Pact, in particular, the 3% threshold for 
national budget deficits and maintaining price stability, plays an important role both in 
stabilizing economic output and in creating European economic confidence, but further 
coordinated efforts on the second part of the Pact are needed in providing the necessary 
basis for an investment-friendly environment and high-quality jobs.  The key to this 
resolution is the prescribed austerity measures as stipulated by the Stability and Growth 
Pact.  Such austerity measure would decrease government budgets and spending on social 
programs.  
 
Vote 2 (Resolution 4027):  World hunger and the elimination of barriers to trade with 
the poorest countries. Apart from market access issues, including the non-tariff aspects, 
the Community should also address supply-side constraints and competitiveness, trade 
related areas, trade development measures, technology transfers, access to information 
and global networks, strategies to promote investment and private sector development.  
The elimination of trade barriers and the promotion of the private sector puts this 
resolution into the neoliberal category.  Voting for this issue would be in favor of 
neoliberalism, while voting against it would be a stance against neoliberal economic 
policy.  
 
Vote 3 (Order 81):  This order deals with environmental standards regarding the quality 
of petrol and diesel fuels emissions from motor vehicles.  This includes the regulation of 
emissions of commercial vehicles.  This is an economic hindrance and a burden on 
business, especially those in the transportation industry.  Voting for this order would be a 
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stance against neoliberal economic policy, while voting for this order would be in favor 
of neoliberal economic policy.    
 
Vote 4 (Consultation 4475):  This vote deals with the principle that aid should be 
conditional on non-productive criteria (relating to the environment, food safety, animal 
welfare and occupational safety) as a social imperative which contributes to r inforcing 
agricultural multi-functionality under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  The CAP 
combines a direct subsidy payment for crops and land which may be cultivated with price 
support mechanisms, including guaranteed minimum prices, import tariffs and quotas on 
certain goods from outside the EU.  Nonetheless, it needs to be introduced carefully nd 
rigorously, in order to ensure effective and uniform compliance with the 38 regulations 
and directives concerned while allowing administrations and producers enough time to
adapt.  Aid is contingent upon environmental concerns, food safety, animal welfare, and 
occupational safety rather than focusing solely on lowering trade barriers.  Environment, 
food safety, animal welfare, and occupational safety act against productivity and overall 
economic competitiveness.  Price minimums, import tariffs, and quotas are also seen as a 
hindrance to free trade.  Voting yay in this consultation would be taking a stance against 
neoliberal economic policy, while voting nay would be a show of support for neoliberal 
economic policy.  
 
Vote 5 (Resolution 3798): This Directive regulates the advertising of tobacco products in 
the media other than television, i.e., in the press and other printed publications, in radio 
broadcasting and in information society services. It also regulates the sponsorship by 
tobacco companies of radio programs and of events or activities involving or taking place 
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in several Member States or otherwise having cross-border effects, including the free or 
discounted distribution of tobacco products. Other forms of advertising, such as 
indirect advertising, as well as the sponsorship of events or activities without cross border 
effects, fall outside the scope of this Directive. Subject to the Treaty, Member 
States retain the competence to regulate these matters as they consider necessary to 
guarantee the protection of human health.  This directive deals with government 
intervention and the hindrance of the tobacco industry.  A vote for this bill would be a 
stance against neoliberal economic policy, while a vote against this bill would be in favor 
of neoliberalism.  
Vote 6 (Resolution 3881):  Adopting a competition policy as an indispensable condition 
to ensure the success of the strategic objective fixed in Lisbon for this decade, fa ing 
significant challenges, such as globalization and enlargement of the European Union. 
This resolution deals with a blanket form of government regulation with regard to 
competition policy throughout all of the European Union.  A yay vote would take a stance 
against neoliberalism, while a nay vote would show favor to neoliberal economic policy.  
 
Vote 7 (Resolution 4420): Noting the problems that developing countries and Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) face due to the growing liberalization of international rade 
and their simultaneous participation in World Trade Organization negotiations and 
increasingly complex Free Trade Areas (FTAs), the inherent inequalities nd the 
considerable difficulties these countries face in trade negotiations, which results in the 
need to increase negotiating capacities and safeguard national interests at all levels 
(especially when agreements involve economic and political giants like the EU and the 
US), and taking the view that trade objectives must be compatible with development.  
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This resolution deals with putting national interest above economic liberalization.  
Creating safeguards for developing countries would hinder free trade.  Voting for this 
resolution would be a stance against neoliberal economic policy, while voting against it 
would show favor towards neoliberalism.  
 
Vote 8 (Resolution 4421): Whereas the right of access – even non-reciprocal access – of 
the poorest countries to the markets of developed countries is quite insufficient to ensure 
real development of trade flows if steps are not also taken to strengthen their capabilities 
in terms of industrial and agricultural development, compliance with certification nd 
standardization requirements – in particular with regard to health and plant protection 
regulations – in the importing countries, and knowledge of marketing channels. Because 
this resolution discusses non-reciprocal market access along with health and plant 
regulations, a yay vote would be a stance against neoliberalism, while a nay vote would 
show favor to neoliberal economic policy.  
 
Vote 9 (Resolution 4418): When developing a trade policy with developing countries it 
is important to consider that customs duties constitute one of the main budget resources 
of developing countries (up to 70% in some Pacific countries) and these countries are 
therefore reluctant to conclude free trade agreements with their neighbors in the absence 
of alternative resources (in particular fiscal resources).  This particul  piece of the 
resolution asks the European Parliament to consider allowing developing states to 
maintain certain customs duties in order to preserve their national budget.  This means 
trade barriers would be sustained.  Voting for this resolution would be a stance against 
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neoliberal economic policy, while voting against this resolution would show favor 
towards neoliberalism.  
 
Vote 10 (Resolution 4416): Calls on the Commission to place greater emphasis, within 
its development policy, on strengthening agricultural and trade capacities, knowledge of 
and compliance with the standards applied in the countries of destination – in particular 
with regard to health and plant protection requirements – and knowledge of marketing 
channels; calls on the Commission to lay down specific objectives in this respect within 
the country strategy papers.  Because this resolution asks the European Commission to 
specifically regulate health and plant protection while providing market information,  
yay vote would be a stance against neoliberalism.  A nay vote would therefore show favor 
towards neoliberal economic policy.  
 
Vote 11 (Strategy Document 1186): This document discusses employment policy 
regarding the mobility of labor within the European Union.  It aims to ease restrictions on 
labor movement between member states in an attempt to improve employment rates and 
as well as the adaptability of the labor market within the European Union.  Labor 
mobility is one of the pillars of neoliberal economic policy.  Thus, voting for this strategy 
would show favor towards neoliberalism, while voting against it would be a stance 
against neoliberal economic policy.  
 
Vote 12 (Resolution 4414): This resolution deals with EU trade policy whereas FTAs, 
particularly those between more than two parties within a geographic region (the Member 
States of the EU are collectively a single negotiating party) and between t o or more 
regional groupings (region-to-region FTAs), serve primarily to integrat  regional 
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markets, they also aim to increase regional political stability, generat good relations and 
trust among neighbors and bring together countries of different levels of development, 
institutional structures and capabilities - differences that may in the long run be evened 
out.  Whereas bilateral FTAs, namely those between two parties (the EU again being 
defined as a single entity), can be considered as possible "path-finders" that erve as 
benchmarks for trade liberalization in the region and may even boost the momentum of 
regional integration, as long as the scope of these agreements can then be replicat d to 
other countries within the region.  This resolution is a proponent of economic 
liberalization while also explaining that FTAs can serve to even out economic 
development levels.  A yay vote on this resolution would show favor towards 
neoliberalism, while a nay vote would be a stance against neoliberal economic policy.  
 
It is interesting to note that there were far more anti-neoliberal votesin he massive 
database than pro-neoliberal votes.  This could suggest a trend or predisposition of the 





Each of the twelve votes will be run in a separate probit regression using Stata/IC 11.0.  
Initially, the use of the dprobit function was considered because it displays the marginal 
effects of gender and voting habits.  While the marginal effects can be useful, th y can 
also be quite misleading since they only hold for a single point which may not even be 
close to a real voter in this case.  In each of the twelve regressions, the vote variable is 
used as the dependent variable with gender and the other control variables being run as 
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independent variables.  All of the jointly significant control variables will be included in 
each of the twelve probit regressions.  A Wald Test will be conducted with each control 
variable to determine its joint significance.  A Wald Test is a post-estimation test for 
simple and composite hypotheses about the parameters of the most recently fitted model.  
If Wald Test does not show significance of the control variable, those coefficients will 
not be shown in the Findings section, but they will be available in appendix.  
 
The two scales will then be run in a linear regression.  Two separate tables will be 
provided, one showing the findings for the pro-neoliberal votes, and one showing the 
findings for the anti-neoliberal pieces of legislation.  Again, because each piece of 
legislation contains more dimensions than simply neoliberalism, this scale approach may 
highlight aspects of a gender and neoliberal relationship that the first set of regressions 
may not present.    
 
The control variable for age is coded as the MEP’s birth year subtracted from 1900.  
Thus, an MEP born in 1935 will be coded as 35.  The control variables for European 
Parliament Group, national party, and member state refer to discrete, and one particular 
category is not necessarily an upgrade over another.  With this in mind it is necessary to 
create dummy variables for each category to include in the probit regression.  One of 
these newly created variables is then deleted and a wildcard is used in order to efficiently 
include the new variables.  If one of the new dummy variables is not omitted from each 
set, then perfect collinearity will be induced.  This appears as an error, but it is a log cal 
error on the part of the researcher.  
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 In the previously mentioned data set (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004), the 28 European 
Parliament Groups that are included are divided into eight different categories based on 
common core principles.  The groups have been divided as follows:  
Group 1 - coded as ep1 
 
Independents for a European of Nations 
Europe of Democracies and Diversities 
 




Group 3 – coded as ep3 
 
European People's Party 
European People's Party-European Democrats 
 




Party of European Socialists 
 
Group 5 – coded as ep5 
 
Progressive European Democrats 
European Democratic Alliance 
Union for Europe 
Union for a Europe of Nations 
 
Group 6 – coded as ep6 
 
Liberal and Democratic Group 
Liberal Democratic and Reform Group 
European Liberal Democratic and Reform Party 
Green Group 
 
Group 7 – coded as ep7 
 
Communist Group 
European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
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European United Left 
Group 8 – coded as ep8 
 
Left Coalition 
Technical Coordination of Democrats and Independents 
Non-attached 
Technical Group of Independents 
 
 
Each MEP belongs to one of these European Parliament Groups.  The inclusion of this 
variable into the regression should show whether or not MEPs are bound by the common 
principles and agendas of these EP groups.  A dummy variable is used for each group 
listed above coded as 1 if the MEP belongs to this group and 0 if the MEP does not 
belong to this group.  
 
There are 170 different national parties recorded for the 696 MEPs in the data set.  Thi  
number is too large to expect any meaningful results in a regression.  National parties 
have been grouped into national party “families” based on the characteristics of the 
parties.  These families include the following: 
 
Anti-European Union (coded as pf1) – These parties are characterized by a general 
skepticism of European Union integration.  These parties generally favor greater national 
sovereignty.  
Christian Democratic (coded as pf2) – This refers to a party which seeks to apply 
Christian principles to public policy.  They are often considered conservative on cultural, 
social and moral issues and progressive on fiscal and economic issues. 
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Conservative (coded as pf3) - Refers to various political and social philosophies that 
support tradition and the status quo, or that call for a return to the values and society of an 
earlier age, the status quo ante (McClain & McMillan 2009).   
Green (coded as pf4) – Refers to political ideology which places a high importance on 
environmental goals, and on achieving these goals through broad-based, grassroots, 
participatory democracy.  
Independent (coded as pf5) – Independent parties vary in ideology, but these parties 
consider themselves outside of the typical liberal and conservative labels of their national 
opponents.  
Left  (coded as pf6) - Refer to parties which tend to support change in traditional social 
orders or the creation of a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and privilege. 
Liberal  (coded as pf7) – Refers to the belief in the importance of individual freedom. 
The rule of law and equality before the law are fundamental to liberalism. 
Regional (coded as pf8) – These parties generally consist of a political ideology that 
focuses on the interests of a particular region or group of regions, whether traditional or 
formal (administrative divisions, country subdivisions, political divisions, sub-national 
units). Regional parties often focus on increasing the region's influence and political 
power, either through movements for limited form of autonomy (devolution, states' 
rights, decentralization) or through stronger measures for a greater degr e of autonomy 
(sovereignty, separatism, independence). They also often favor loose federations or 
confederations over a unitary state with a strong central government. 
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Right (coded as pf9) - Refers to parties which tend to support the preservation of 
traditional or cultural values and customs or maintaining some form of social hierarc y or 
private control of the means of production.  
Socialist (coded as pf10) – Generally refers to the economic organization advocating 
public or direct worker ownership and administration of the means of production and 
allocation of resources, and a society characterized by equal access to resources for all 
individuals with a method of compensation based on the amount of labor expended 
(Newman 2005).  
 
This variable should help to determine the extent to which Members of Parliament re 
bound by their national parties’ ideology.  As mentioned earlier, political parties are a 
nominal category making it necessary to use dummy variables for each political family 
(coded as 1 if a MEP belongs to this political family or 0 of the MEP does not). 
 
Because this data set was created in 2004, only 15 member states will be included in the 
data as the accession of the other members had not yet occurred.  These member states 
are coded as follows: 
Austria – ms1 
Belgium – ms2 
Germany – ms3 
Denmark – ms4 
Spain – ms5 
Finland – ms6 
France – ms7 
Greece – ms8 
Italy – ms9 
Ireland – ms10 
Luxembourg –ms11 
Netherlands – ms12 
Portugal – ms13 
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Sweden – ms14 
United Kingdom – ms15 
 
Again, a dummy variable is used for each member state, and they are coded as 1 if the 
MEP belongs to the member state and 0 if the MEP does not.   
 
 
The dependent vote variables have been simplified to only include yes and no votes.  The 
roll call votes actually account for MEPs being absent, abstaining, or not being a Member 
of Parliament at the time of the vote, but these observations have been omitted from the 
vote variables.   
 
The probit regression will show the relevance of gender with regard to the selected EP 
votes that relate to neoliberal economic policy.  If gender is relevant for a particular vote, 
it will then be decided of the number of female MEPs was significant enough to change 













The probit and linear regression results begin on the following page.  A few technicalities 
jump out right away.  First, the socialist party family has been omitted in order to avoid 
perfect collinearity in the data as explained in the methodology section.  Other variables 
have been omitted because the binary variables happen to predict success perfects and 
must be dropped.  The Wald Tests were run on the control variables for member state, 
European Parliament Group, and party family.  Only party family proved to be jointly 
significant as a control variable.  The controls for member state and European Parli ment 
Group are not jointly significant, and they have been dropped from the probit regression 
as well as the linear regression with scales.  Following the Wald Test results, the 
dependent variables for vote and the control variables for gender, age, and party family 
are all included.  The Wald Test results are available in the appendix section
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Figure 2 – Probit Regression (Votes 1 – 4) 
t statistics in parentheses 









 Vote1 (3062) Vote 2 (4027) Vote 3 (81) Vote 4 (4475) 
Gender -.3348018* 
(-2.06) 
0.119                    
(0.83) 
0.00494    
(0.02) 




-0.00775    
(-1.09) 
0.0179    
(1.62) 
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-0.771*   
 (-2.30) 
1.575*   
(2.20) 




omitted omitted omitted omitted 
Chi square 67.27 21.54 63.54 47.61 
Loglinear -183.0342 -251.58295 -109.95178 -273.33647 
Psuedo R2 0.1552 0.0411 0.2242 0.0801 
N 343 473 217 442 
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t statistics in parentheses 









 Vote5 (3798) Vote 6 (3881) Vote 7 (4420) Vote 8 (4421) 
Gender -0.225    
(-1.23) 
0.00233    
(0.02) 
0.0339    
(0.15) 
0.132    
(0.67) 
Age -0.00617    
(-0.70) 
-0.00438    
(-0.61) 
-0.0128    
(-1.03) 
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(0.29) 
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0.916    
(1.57) 
omitted -0.713    
(-0.98) 
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(-1.07) 












1.153    
(1.93) 




-0.130    
(-0.32) 
-0.718    
(-1.79) 
-0.781*   
(-1.96) 




0.908*   
(2.45) 
-0.758*   
(-2.02) 
-0.761    
(-1.92) 




omitted omitted omitted omitted 
Chi square 37.19 78.25 68.65 63.88 
Loglinear -161.70795 -254.85491 -106.59115 -130.51891 
Psuedo R2 0.1031 0.1331 0.2436 0.1966 
N 374 440 210 248 
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t statistics in parentheses 








 Vote 9 (4418) Vote 10 (4416) Vote 11 (1186) Vote 12 (4414) 
Gender 0.0615    
(0.29) 




0.243    
(1.39) 
Age -0.000182    
(-0.02) 
-0.00812    
(-0.80) 
0.0164    
(0.79) 
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(1.82) 















0.159    
(0.51) 








0.0303    
(0.10) 
-0.465    
(-0.70) 




-0.696    
(-0.89) 
1.171    
(1.82) 






0.0636    
(0.23) 
-1.585*   
(-2.28) 










-1.052*   
(-2.52) 
0.399    
(1.11) 
-1.157*   
(-2.18) 




-1.037*   
(-2.48) 
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omitted omitted omitted omitted 
Chi square 64.14 67.19 16.93 102.61 
Loglinear -116.1452 -134.76076 -33.899758 -176.22482 
Psuedo R2 0.2164 0.1995 0.1998 0.2255 
N 223 316 131 388 







The focus of this probit regression was the gender variable, and it was only significant for 
a single vote in this analysis.  The findings of this project indicate that gender ha  little 
effect on how MEPs voted on neoliberal policies. Let us start by examining the pro-
neoliberal votes (1, 2, 11, 12).  If we look at the first vote we see that gender is 
significant at the 5% level.  It is also a negative coefficient, indicating that women MEPs 
were more likely to vote against neoliberalism in this case.  Voting no on Vote 1 meant 
voting against a Growth and Stability Pact which includes measures of fiscal austerity.  
This first piece of legislation confirms the expectation that female MEPs would be less 
likely to support neoliberal economic policies.  This is the one and only occasion in the 
probit regressions where this expectation is confirmed.  When looking at Vote 2we 
notice that not only is gender not significant, but it also has a positive coefficient.  This 
piece of legislation deals with the removal of trade barriers between the European Union 
and developing countries.  There is very little difference between male and female voting 
patterns here.  Vote 11 follows the same pattern.  This document discusses easing 
restrictions on labor mobility within the European Union.  Gender has a small and 
negative coefficient and is not significant at the 5% level in this probit regression.  The 
coefficient for gender in the regression with Vote 12 is again small but positive.  Gender 
is not significant at the 5% level.  This vote is a resolution regarding Free Trad Areas 
(FTAs) with the European Union acting as a single entity in relation to other stat s.        
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Now we look to probit regression results of the anti-neoliberal pieces of legislation (3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10).  Vote 3 is an order regarding environmental standards, specifically diesel 
fuel emissions and commercial vehicles.  The coefficient for the gender variable in this 
regression is positive, but it is not significant at the 5% level.  Vote 4 is an EP 
consultation.  This vote deals with the principle that aid should be conditional on non-
productive criteria (relating to the environment, food safety, animal welfare and 
occupational safety).  While the coefficient for the gender variable is negativ , it is small 
and not significant at the 5% level, meaning that men and women did not deviate much in 
their vote on this consultation.  Gender has a higher coefficient in the regression with 
Vote 5 and is also negative indicating that women were more likely to vote against 
neoliberalism in this case. However, gender is still not significant at the 5% l vel.   This 
piece of legislation deals with regulation of marketing in the tobacco industry.  The probit 
regressions for votes 6, 7, 8, and 9 all produce very small and positive coefficients for the 
gender variable.  None of these regressions have a gender variable significant at the 5% 
level.  Vote 6 is a resolution calling for a blanket form of government regulation with 
regard to competition policy throughout all of the European Union.  Vote 7 includes a 
policy to put national interest above economic liberalization by creating safe uards for 
developing states.  Vote 8 is a resolution for non-reciprocal market access along with 
health and plant regulations.   Vote 9 asks the European Parliament to consider allowing 
developing states to maintain certain customs duties in order to preserve their national 
budget.  The gender variable for Vote 10 produces a larger and negative coefficient than 
the previous votes.  This suggests that women were more likely to vote against 
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neoliberalism in this case, but the gender variable is not significant.  This resolution calls 
for regulation of health and plant protection.    
 
Only one piece of European Parliament legislation dealing with neoliberalism showed 
gender as being a significant factor in determining the voting habits of MEPs.  The 
gender variable for the other eleven votes have small coefficients and sporadic signs 
indicating no pattern with regard to gender and legislative voting on neoliberal economi  




For all twelve probit regressions, the coefficients for the age variable are very small and 
had sporadic signs.  There is exactly the same number of positive coefficients as there are 
negative coefficients for this variable, and not a single coefficient is greater th n 0.018.  
This shows no evidence for a relationship between the age of an MEP and his or her 
likelihood of voting for a neoliberal economic policy in the European Parliament.  
Despite evidence in the literature for a generational effect on economic perspectives, one 




The Wald Test for the party family variable has shown that this control variable is jointly 
significant for all twelve of the votes.  The results for these tests can be found in the 
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appendix.  This is not a surprising result as a relationship between party and voting habits 
has been established in previous literature.  Being a member of the cons rvative party 
family and the left party family appear to have the greatest effect on the voting habits of 
an MEP as they pertain to neoliberalism.  As expected by the general political ideology of 
these two families, the conservative party family is more likely to vote for neoliberal 
economic policy, and the l ft party family is more likely to vote against neoliberal 
economic policy.  This is not the case for every vote, but when looking at all of the 
twelve regressions, this is the trend.  The other party families do not have a distinct
pattern in their support or opposition for the neoliberal legislation.  Regardless, it is clear 
that the party family variable is responsible for a significant portion of MEPs’ voting 
habits for the twelve selected votes.  This suggests that while parties do not necessarily 
vote consistently on neoliberal economic policy, the party members are more likely to 












Linear Regression with Scales 
 








































Gender 0.293    
 (1.01) 









































































For these linear regressions the votes have been pooled by type (pro-neoliberal r anti-
neoliberal).   
 
It is important to note the number of observations for each of these linear regressions.  
They number of observations has dropped dramatically.  Because of the nature of the 
 Anti-neoliberal 
Gender -0.350    
(-0.50) 














































pooled regression, it only includes observations (MEPs) who voted on all of the votes in 
the regression.  This means that any Member of Parliament who abstained from a vote or 
were not present is not included in the regression.  This small number of observations 
could significantly weaken the integrity of the results.  
 
Figure 5 shows a linear regression with the pro-neoliberal votes (1, 2, 11, 12) pooled 
together with the same control variables from the probit regressions.  The socialist party 
family has again been omitted to avoid collinearity with the binary variables.  Other party 
families have been omitted because they happen to predict success perfectly.  The votes 
are pooled into these groups because each vote has more to it than neoliberalism.  They 
are more complex than one simple label can explain.  Because of this, a linear regr ssion 
with pooled votes could possibly highlight a relationship between gender and support for 
neoliberalism that the initial probit regressions could not.  This expectation was ot 
fulfilled, however, as the linear regressions with the pooled votes did not produce 
significantly different results than the probit regressions.  Neither of the variables for 
gender ended up being significant.  There is not even coordination in the direction of the 
coefficients as the pro-neoliberal regression produced a positive coefficient, and the anti-
neoliberal regression produced a negative coefficient.  Remember, the votes were coded 
so that 1 would express support for neoliberalism and 0 would express opposition to 
neoliberalism.  This means that if there was a pattern of men and women voting 
differently on neoliberal issues, the two coefficients should at least have the same sign.  
No further evidence was developed for a relationship between age and support for 
neoliberalism as it was not significant in either regression.  Again, party family proved to 
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be the most influential of the independent variables on voting habits.  The cons rvative 
and left party families show the same direction of support for neoliberal policies.  Not all 
parties were significant in impacting voting behavior, but as a whole, party family is the 
single-most influential variable in determining which way an MEP will vote on the 
twelve selected neoliberal issues. 














The focus of this study has been the impact of gender on neoliberal economic legislation 
within the European Parliament.  The coefficients for the gender variable are only 
significant at the 5% level for one of the twelve selected pieces of legislation.  Not only 
are the size of the coefficients sporadic, but the signs of the coefficient are also sporadic.  
This means that gender had little effect on voting habits, and it also shows that women do 
not consistently support or oppose neoliberal economic legislation based on the twelve 
selected votes.  This probit regression has produced no pattern with regard to gender and 
the likelihood of voting for or against neoliberal economic policies in the European 
Parliament.  This is an unexpected result as previous literature has found patterns in 
legislative bodies considering gender and voting.  Previous literature has also suggested 
that women would have differing views on neoliberal economic policy itself as well as its 
implementation.  No evidence has been found for such a relationship in this particular 
analysis.  This does not necessarily mean that there is no relationship between gender and 
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neoliberal economic legislation, but one was not discovered here.  The small sample size 
of legislation could be one cause of the sporadic findings.  
 
What explanations other than parameter limitations could help shed light on the results of 
this regression?  Why does the literature suggest that men and women think differently 
about economics while this study has shown men and women to not vote in a 
significantly different manner?  A return to the idea of a European economic identity 
could provide some answers.  As noted earlier, literature has examined the development 
of a European identity through the evolution of the European Union, but this has not been 
analyzed thoroughly from a purely economic perspective.  It is possible that the goals and 
ambitions of economic unity within the European Union as well as a unified economic 
policy with the rest of the world may overcome trends in gender and economic ideology.  
 
Another possible explanation lies in Carol Gilligan’s theory of moral development 
(Gilligan 1982).  Gilligan’s theory of moral development in women and girls consisted of 
three levels.  In the first level, moral reasoning is based entirely around what is best for 
one’s self.  A girl or woman in the second stage, on the other hand, makes decisions 
based on a sense of goodness as well as self-sacrifice.  The third and most sophisticated 
stage of feminine moral reasoning, Gilligan held, valued truth as well as se f-sacrifice; in 
this stage, women are able to reason through consequences and the impact that one’s 
actions has on others.  This self-sacrifice often pertains to relationships for women.  In 
this sense, there could be a sacrificing of values in order to allow further progress of the 







Age:  While previous literature shows a possible link to generation and political and 
economic ideology, this probit regression analysis has yielded no evidence to confirm 
this.  The coefficients are consistently close to zero, and the signs vary from vote to vote.  
This means none of the relationships are statistically significant.  Of course, this does not 
mean there is no connection.  Not only is the voting sample for this regression analysis 
small, but the votes all fall into the category of neoliberal economic policy.  Nonetheless, 
age has clearly shown itself to be a nonfactor in this particular regression.   
 
If previous literature has shown a link between age and political ideology, why is there no 
evidence for it here?  One possible answer may lie in the place of emphasis by previous 
literature regarding this issue.  Literature has focused on the changing ideology of voters 
rather than the legislators’ themselves.  It may well have been incorrect to assume that 
legislators follow the same patterns as their constituencies.  Those making a career in 
politics cannot likely afford to significantly alter their political ideology over time.  
Politicians with ideological shifts over time are often viewed as “flip flo pers,” and they 
are not considered to be confident in their values.  This would not be conducive to re-
election.  Such deviations can be viewed as hypocritical or ambiguous by the voting 
population.  If an MEP’s political ideology remains relatively constant over time, it 
would make sense that political party would be a much greater indicator of neoliberal 
voting habits.   
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European Parliament Group:  Because these groups are political coalitions of a number 
of European parties, national parties and independent politicians, it would be logical f r 
this control variable to be correlated with the control for party family.  This was not the 
case, however, as the EPG control variable was shown to not be jointly significant at the 
5% level for any of the twelve selected votes.  This was shown by the Wald Test 
performed for each individual vote.   
 
Why is this the case?  Upon review of the European Parliament Groups on page 35, it can 
be seen that these groups are not cleanly divided by political ideology.  These coalitions 
are not formed solely on these ideals; there is a more complex strategy behind th ir 
formation.  European Parliament Groups benefit greatly compared to individual MEPs.  
For example, a coalition between the European Greens and the European Free Allianc
would yield much greater power than acting as stand-alone parties as their causes would 
attract greater support.  Another important incentive for group formation is financial 
benefit.  Financial subsidiaries are provided to Groups by the Parliament that are not 
offered to independent MEPs.  Group members are also guaranteed seats on particular 
committees.  With such important benefits for Group members, other strategic factors
would be involved in Group formation.  Strategic alliances would likely be formed with 
those who are not always ideologically identical on important issues, including neoliberal 
economic policy.  This could explain the lack of joint significance as a control variable in 
this probit regression. 
 
 58
Member State:  The control variable for member state was only found to be jointly 
significant for vote 7 in the regression.  Vote 7 deals with safeguarding the national 
interests of developing countries when faced with policies of trade liberalization and 
WTO negotiations.  The fact that member state is jointly significant for this vote at the 
5% level appears to be a coincidence however.  When looking at the other 11 votes in the 
appendix section, member state does consistently have a larger coefficient than the 
previous two control variables discussed.  When analyzing the tables provided in the 
appendix, there are votes in which a particular member state plays a significant role i  
determining voting habits, but the results are high inconsistent and dispersed.  It i fair to 
conclude that an MEP’s member state did not significantly affect their vote on the12
selected votes in this regression.  
 
Why is it that MEPs of a different culture, different historical background, and different 
national interests can have such similar voting habits?  Two possible explanations could 
help to shed some light on this dilemma.  The first explanation deals with socioeconomi 
status.  The idea that the politicians are, more often than not, financially privileged, may 
influence their voting behavior, especially in the economic arena.  This issue is discu sed 
in detail within the literature regarding “ambition theory.”  This theory deals with goal 
orientation and motivation in attempting to overcome socioeconomic status.  Simply put 
by Pauline Stone, “it is almost an axiom of contemporary social science that human
aspirations are a function of where one is located in the social structure” (Stone106).  It 
is possible that the shared privileged upbringing by MEPs is more influential than their 
own borders in determining their position on the selected neoliberal economic policies.  
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The second explanation deals with the idea of an economic European identity provided 
by the European Union.  Literature has discussed the slow formation of a European 
identity within the European Union (Rousseau and Van Der Veen 2005), but literature is 
sparse regarding an economic identity.  It is likely that MEPs and other elites would be 
more likely than others to have a European identity as they are more informed of EU 
politics and have influence in their direction.  It is important to remember that the 
European Union evolved from the European Economic Community (EEC) which formed 
a customs union throughout Europe.  Thus, the European Union began with a purely 
economic agenda.  It would make sense that a desire for economic unity may overcome 
one’s own national identity and national background.   
 
Party Family:   The party family control variable was the only independent variable in 
this probit regression to be jointly significant at the 5% level for all twelve of the selected 
votes.  Political party has been shown consistently by previous research to greatly imp ct 
legislators’ voting habits, but the consistency found in this regression for the European 
Parliament was not expected.  Party affiliation is certainly a function of political 
ideology, and this shows that MEPs are not deviating much from this ideology.  It could 
have been hypothesized, however, that the overarching interests of the European Union 
may supersede party affiliation.  This was not the case.  The domestic political party of 
the MEPs is the single greatest predictor of neoliberal economic voting for the twelve 
selected votes.  It is important to remember that the variable for political party was 
divided in party family groups.  This greatly widens the ideological boundaries compared 
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to running a regression with each individual party represented.  As mentioned before, this 
was not possible due to the large number of domestic political parties in relation to the 
number of MEPs.  There may be stronger findings if party was measured more precisely.    
 
The consistency of the party family coefficients is surprising for another reason.  Voter 
turnout for European Parliament elections is generally lower throughout the member 
states of the European Union than their own domestic elections.  Ann Olson explains that 
even though voter turnout for European Parliament elections “varies immensely among
member states, the average EP-turnout has constantly been more than 20 percentage 
points lower than the average turnout in corresponding prior national parliamentary 
elections” (Olson 2006).  The numbers have consistently declined since the formation of 
the European Parliament in 1979 which signifies declining interest.  This low level of 
interest in European Parliament affairs could mean that there is less pressure by 
Parliament members to vote along party lines in order to please their constitue cy.  The 
results of this regression show, however, that legislators are still voting in li e with their 





While no pattern between gender and neoliberal economic voting habits in the European 
Parliament have been discovered in this analysis, there is a great deal of room for further 
study.  A similar study conducted with a much larger sample of neoliberal economic 
legislation may provide different results.  Further study regarding the existence of a 
unified European economic identity may also help to explain some of the results 
 61
produced in this analysis.  Because gender has been shown to influence legislative voting 
in other legislative bodies, a study looking at gender with a wide range of other issues 
outside of neoliberal economic policy would show if the European Parliament acts 
against gender trends on a greater scale than neoliberal economic policy.  If this is the 
case, then there may be other explanations for the lack of a relationship in this study and 
not discount the existence of a gender factor with regard to neoliberal economi policy in 
other political arenas.   
 
A study including a bivariate regression between gender and party may better describe 
the relationship of these two variables.  Women are more likely to join some political 
parties over others, which means that the party family control variable could be masking 
gender differences. It is possible that gender differences could be found when looking 
within European parties rather than looking at the two variables separately.  
   
More research should be done before declaring that female MEPs do not act differently 
on neoliberal economic policy than their male counterparts.  This research has simply 
shown that female MEPs do not vote in a significantly different manner than their male 
counterparts on the twelve selected pieces of neoliberal economic legislation, and it 
provides no evidence of a gender factor within the European Parliament with regard to 
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VOTE 1 (3062) 
Wald Test: Party Family 
 
chi2 =   55.38 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 5% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 1.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
 
chi2 =  4.97 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6642 
 
The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant at the
10% level, so the table will not be included in this section.   
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 17.56 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2274 
 
The control variables for member states are not jointly significant at the 10% level for 
Vote 1, so the table will not be included in this section.   
 
VOTE 2 (4027)  
Wald Test: Party Family 
 
chi2 = 19.57 
Prob > chi2 = 0.00
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The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 2.  
Two variables have been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict 
success perfectly.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
chi2 = 4.47 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7244 
 
The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
2, so the table will not be included in this section.  One variable has been omitted and 
observations dropped because it predicts success perfectly.  
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 12.19 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5912 
 
The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 2, 
so the table will not be included in this section. 
 
Vote 3 (81) 
 
 
Wald Test: Party Family 
 
chi2 = 39.83 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 2.  
Three variables have been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict 
success perfectly.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
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chi2 = 2.39 
Prob > chi2 = 0.9351 
 
The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
3, so the table will not be included in this section.  
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 11.07 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6046 
 
The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 3, 
so the table will not be included in this section.   
 
Vote 4 (4475) 
 
Wald Test: Party Family 
 
chi2 = 38.59 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 4.  
One variable has been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict success 
perfectly.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
chi2 = 8.91 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2590 
 
The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
4, so the table will not be included in this section.  It can be found in Figure 4.2 in the 
appendix. 
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Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 16.71 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2128 
 
The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 4, 
so the table will not be included in this section.  One variable has been omitted and the 
observations dropped because they predict success perfectly.  
 
 
Vote 5 (3798) 
 
 
Wald Test: Party Family 
 
chi2 = 32.70 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0002 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 5.  
One variable has been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict success 
perfectly.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
chi2 = 8.88 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1807 
 
The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
5, so the table will not be included in this section.  One variable has been omitted and 
observations dropped because it predicts success perfectly.  
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 13.68 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2510 
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The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 5, 
so the table will not be included in this section.  Three variables have been omitted and 
the observations dropped because they predict success perfectly.  
 
Vote 6 (3881) 
 
 
Wald Test: Party Family 
 
chi2 = 62.96 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 6.  
One variable has been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict success 
perfectly.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
chi2 = 6.14 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5230 
 
The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
6, so the table will not be included in this section.     
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 10.04 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7589 
 
The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 6, 
so the table will not be included in this section.   
 
Vote 7 (4420) 
 
 
Wald Test: Party Family 
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chi2 = 55.08 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 7.  One variable has been omitted and the observations 
dropped because they predict success perfectly.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
chi2 = 5.57 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5905 
 
The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
7, so the table will not be included in this section.     
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 23.15 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0400 
 
The control variables for Member State are jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 7.  One 
variable has been omitted and observations dropped because it predicts success perfectly.  
 
 
Vote 8 (4421) 
 
 
Wald Test: Party Family 
 
chi2 = 51.03 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 8.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
chi2 = 4.72 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6935 
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The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
8, so the table will not be included in this section.     
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 19.59 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1059 
 
The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 8, 
so the table will not be included in this section.   
 
Vote 9 (4418) 
 
 
Wald Test: Party Family 
 
chi2 = 55.91 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 9.  One variable has been omitted and observations dropped 
because it predicts success perfectly.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
chi2 = 5.89 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5532 
 
The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
9, so the table will not be included in this section.     
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 18.96 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1245 
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The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 9, 
so the table will not be included in this section.  One variable has been omitted and 
observations dropped because it predicts success perfectly.   
 
Vote 10 (4416) 
 
 
Wald Test: Party Family 
 
chi2 = 51.26 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 10.  One variable has been omitted and observations dropped 
because it predicts success perfectly.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
chi2 = 5.20 
Prob > chi2 = 5.20 
 
The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
10, so the table will not be included in this section.   
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 17.75 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1671 
 
The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 10, 
so the table will not be included in this section.  One variable has been omitted and 
observations dropped because it predicts success perfectly.   
 
 
Vote 11 (4414) 
 
 
Wald Test: Party Family 
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chi2 = 77.46 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 11.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
chi2 = 5.47 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6031 
 
The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
11, so the table will not be included in this section.  .   
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 16.45 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2258 
 
The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 11, 
so the table will not be included in this section.   
 
Vote 12 (4475) 
 
 
Wald Test: Party Family 
 
chi2 = 38.59 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the 
dependent variable for Vote 12.  
Wald Test: European Parliament Group 
chi2 = 8.91 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2590 
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The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for Vote 
12, so the table will not be included in the regression.    
Wald Test: Member State 
chi2 = 16.71 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2128 
 
The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for Vote 12, 
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